2019-05-30 | Chun-Lei YANG：Voluntary Separation as a Disciplinary Device for Long-Term Cooperation: Reconciling Theory with Evidence
In this paper, we provide an evidence-based theory to explain how partners forge a
cooperative relationship when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate
the match. We utilize laboratory methods to gather insights on the evolution of co-
operation in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma game (VSRPD). We
observe behavioral patterns that are at odds with out-for-tat (OFT) which, based on
the VSRPD literature, is a disciplinary device that helps facilitate mutual coopera-
tion in the long run. Our Pro-Partnership Proposition is formulated to accommodate
the observation that human subjects often favor a more forgiving stay-but-act-like-a-
stranger move instead of OFT to punish norm violators. A new class of equilibria,
called the CoDe-indierent equilibria, is introduced to address the within-match re-
wards and punishments found in the data.
Chun-Lei Yang is currently a professor in Nanjing Audit University and won the title of "Changjiang Scholar" in 2016. He received his PhD degree in economics from the University of Dortmund in 1993. His main research area is experimental and behavioral economics. Courses taught: Microeconomics, Game theory, Industrial organization, Theory of contract, Supermodularity models.